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ARTICLE 
 
APPLICATION OF THE CHARTER 
TO UNIVERSITIES’ LIMITATION OF EXPRESSION 
 
by Dwight NEWMAN*  
 
La Charte canadienne des droits et libertés s'applique uniquement à l'action 
gouvernementale. En conséquence de ce champ d'application limité, plusieurs 
questions fondamentales se sont posées au regard de son application aux contextes 
d'enseignement postsecondaire. Bien que la jurisprudence semblait envisagée de 
prime abord les universités comme des zones libres de l’application de la Charte, 
elle semble plus récemment affirmer que ce n'est pas le cas. Cet article exploite la 
règle sur l'application de la Charte, réarticulée par la juge Deschamps, afin de 
clarifier cette situation. Il tente de résoudre l’opposition apparente entre liberté 
académique et application de la Charte dans un contexte universitaire. Il démontre 
que dans le contexte actuel, l'application de la Charte semble au contraire 
susceptible de promouvoir les valeurs de la liberté académique. 
 
 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms applies only to governmental 
action. As a result of this limited scope of application, there have been significant 
questions concerning its application to post-secondary education contexts.  Although 
early case law appeared to establish universities as a Charter-free zone, later cases 
have made clear that this is not the case. This paper uses Justice Deschamps’s 
rearticulated rule on Charter application to make this point clear, shows that this 
revised approach is showing itself in case law, and challenges claims that academic 
freedom gives reasons not to see Charter application in a university context.  Indeed, 
the paper argues that in the present context, Charter application actually seems 
likely to further the values of academic freedom. 
 
 
                                                 
* . Professor of Law, University of Saskatchewan.  B.A. (Regina), J.D. 
(Saskatchewan), B.C.L., M.Phil., D.Phil. (Oxford).  Member of the Ontario 
and Saskatchewan bars.  I am grateful for the discussion of the paper as 
part of the Constitutional Series with Justice Deschamps, and I thank 
Zhou Han Rou, Hoi Kong, and Maxime St-Hilaire for organizing it.  For 
their comments at the discussion, I thank Justice Deschamps, Hugo Cyr, 
Paul Daly, Hoi Kong, Jean Leclair, Zhou Han Ru, Maxime St-Hilaire, and 
Daniel Turp.  I also thank Lorelle Binnion for reading and commenting on 
a draft of the paper. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Questions about the application of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms1 have been heavily contested in the context of 
post-secondary education.2 The challenging aspect of these 
questions arises because the Canadian Charter, unlike the Quebec 
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms,3 applies only to 
governments.4  The Quebec framework works quite differently and 
has, for instance, enabled the application of the Quebec Charter 
even as between students in the context of competing views and 
actions related to a student strike.5      
 
Leading case law that first distinguished governmentally-
controlled actors to which the Canadian Charter would apply from 
non-governmental actors to which it would not apply involved 
postsecondary education. The famous McKinney and 
Douglas/Kwantlen cases drew distinctions between different kinds 
                                                 
1.   Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, being Schedule B to the 
Constitution Act, 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.). 
2.   The other prevalent context involves health care issues.  See e.g. Stoffman 
v. Vancouver General Hospital, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 483 and Eldridge v. British 
Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 [Eldridge] (latter 
extending former’s focus on government control to also look at 
governmental activities, in context of hospital delivering government 
health care programmes in a discriminatory manner).   
3.   Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C-12. 
4.   On Charter application generally, see chapter 18 of Guy RÉGIMBALD & 
Dwight NEWMAN, The Law of the Canadian Constitution, Toronto, 
LexisNexis, 2013.  Charter application questions of course are primarily 
determined by interpretation and application of s. 32(1) of the Charter: 
“32. (1) This Charter applies (a) to the Parliament and government of 
Canada in respect of all matters within the authority of Parliament 
including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory and Northwest 
Territories; and (b) to the legislature and government of each province in 
respect of all matters within the authority of the legislature of each 
province.”  That the Charter applies only to governments is actually an 
important way of ensuring that it properly achieves the values it sets out 
to achieve.  If the Charter applied to private actors, the constraints imposed 
upon individuals’ liberty through such application would actually defeat 
rather than serve the cause of protecting individuals’ fundamental 
freedoms. 
5.   See Beausoleil v. Cégep régional de Lanaudière, 2012 QCCS 1673. 
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of postsecondary educational institutions based on the degree of 
government control to which they were subjected.6  This early case 
law based on traditional governance structures, while subjecting 
many post-secondary institutions other than universities to the 
Charter, seemed to many to put universities generally into a 
Charter-free zone. While other educational contexts have seen a 
deep engagement with the implications of the Charter for 
expansions of student rights,7 university administrators have 
revelled in the sanctity of an elite position above Charter 
challenges.8  But, as this paper will argue, newer case law makes it 
clear that this position has effectively been overturned in so far as 
universities are actually carrying out governmental activity. 
                                                 
6.   Cf. McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229 (government 
control of university not sufficient for Charter application in context of 
challenge to mandatory retirement policy); Harrison v. University of British 
Columbia, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 451 (same conclusion with another university); 
and Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Association v. Douglas College, [1990] 3 
S.C.R. 570 (government control of a college sufficient for Charter to apply, 
with the same true in Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, 
[1991] 2 S.C.R. 211 where the board of a college was called an “emanation 
of government”).  The sort of university mandatory retirement policies at 
issue were pursued further in human rights litigation in Dickason v. 
University of Alberta, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 1103 and later cases, with the 
eventual effect that many universities’ mandatory retirement policies have 
now been removed, despite the lack of success of the Charter argument on 
the issue in McKinney.  Sometimes, individuals have still been forced to 
retire during the transitional period prior to the removal of mandatory 
retirement and been unable to have this overturned: see e.g. French v. 
Nova Scotia (Attorney General), 2012 NSSC 394, 323 N.S.R. (2d) 150. 
7.   For an earlier discussion, see Ailsa M. WATKINSON, Education, Student 
Rights, and the Charter, Saskatoon, Purich Publishing, 1999.  For a more 
recent and extraordinarily deep analysis of key evolving issues, see 
Paul CLARKE, Understanding Curricular Control:  Rights Conflicts, Public 
Education, and the Charter, London, Althouse, 2013. 
8.   University administrators writing about the area have been pleased to find 
that courts are ready to leave decision-making in the hands of universities 
themselves.  See e.g. David A. HANNAH, Student-Institution Legal 
Relationships in Colleges and Universities in the Common Law Provinces of 
Canada: An Analysis of the Case Law from 1982 to 1994, PhD Dissertation, 
Bowling Green, Bowling Green State University, 1996 (unpublished); 
Robyn JACOBSON, Managing Conflict and Resolving Disputes Involving 
Students on University Campuses, PhD Dissertation, Toronto, York 
University, 2012 (unpublished). 
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The university context has remained subject to contestation 
over recent years. The Greater Vancouver case, in which Justice 
Deschamps applied and succinctly restated Eldridge’s9 expanded 
framework for Charter application,10 was on one factual level about 
advertising on buses but interestingly involved advertisements 
sought to be purchased by the Canadian Federation of Students.11  
And, in recent years, the Alberta courts’ consideration of Charter 
application in the context of the Pridgen12 case on a university’s 
attempt to censor students’ Facebook postings marks a significant 
new discussion of the implications of the changes made in 
Eldridge13 and Greater Vancouver.14 The Pridgen case evoked a 
whole new wave of comments on the possibility of Charter 
                                                 
9.   Eldridge, prec., note 2. 
10.   Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority v. Canadian Federation of 
Students – British Columbia Component, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 295, par. 16 
(Greater Vancouver) (Deschamps J. summarizing effect of Eldridge, prec., 
note 2 as leading to the following rule: “Thus, there are two ways to 
determine whether the Charter applies to an entity’s activities: by 
enquiring into the nature of the entity or by enquiring into the nature of 
its activities. If the entity is found to be “government”, either because of its 
very nature or because the government exercises substantial control over 
it, all its activities will be subject to the Charter. If an entity is not itself a 
government entity but nevertheless performs governmental activities, only 
those activities which can be said to be governmental in nature will be 
subject to the Charter.”)  
11.   Id., par. 3-4. 
12.   Pridgen v. University of Calgary, 2012 ABCA 139, 350 D.L.R. (4th) 1 
[Pridgen CA], affg Pridgen v. University of Calgary, 2010 ABQB 644, 325 
D.L.R. (4th) 441 [Pridgen Trial]. 
13.   Eldridge, prec., note 2. 
14.   Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority v. Canadian Federation of 
Students – British Columbia Component, prec., note 10. 
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application to universities in the media,15 on blogs,16 and from law 
firms.17 
 
There are, of course, ordinary Charter application cases that 
merely happen to arise in a university context but that do not 
engage any special considerations because of the university 
context.18  For example, searches of a dorm room by a university’s 
security personnel are subject to normal Charter application 
analysis in terms of whether the security personnel were 
functioning at the time as state agents.19  Or, a student uttering 
threats will not find Charter freedom of expression values applied 
against university discipline proceedings, but this will be because 
of standard rules on lack of freedom of expression protection for 
threats rather than out of any distinctive feature of the university 
context.20 A student putting unclear Charter arguments in a 
                                                 
15.  See e.g. John CARPAY, “A Victory for Free Speech at the University of 
Calgary”, National Post, May 11, 2012.  
16.   See e.g. Jennifer KOSHAN, “Face-ing the Charter’s Application on University 
Campuses”, posting of June 13, 2012 on ablawg.ca, online: 
<http://ablawg.ca/2012/06/13/face-ing-the-charters-application-on-
university-campuses-5/> (accessed October 28, 2014).  See also “Does the 
Charter Apply to Universities”, posting of October 17, 2010 on Education 
Law Blog, online: <http://educationlawblog.ca/does-the-charter-apply-
to-universities/> (accessed October 28, 2014).  
17.   See e.g. Sally GOMERY & Anthony MORRIS, “Application of Canadian Charter 
to Universities Remains Unclear”, June 2012 posting, online: 
<http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/67808/ 
application-of-canadian-charter-to-universities-remains-unclear> 
(accessed October 28, 2014). 
18.   The Supreme Court of Canada decision in Trinity Western University v. 
College of Teachers, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772, 2001 SCC 31, could also properly 
be considered an example of a case raising Charter application, but with 
the issue answered in ways not hinging on the university context.  As 
stated by Iacobucci and Bastarache JJ.’s judgment at par. 25, the Charter 
does not apply to a privately funded university as a private institution, in 
the same way that it does not apply to any private actor.  
19.   See e.g. R. v. Fitch, [1994] B.C.J. No. 2027, 93 C.C.C. (3d) 185 (C.A.) (check 
of room when rent overdue to see if had been abandoned leading to 
discovery of stolen property). 
20.   See Zhang v. University of Western Ontario, 2010 ONSC 6489, 328 D.L.R. 
(4th) 289 (S.C.J.).  The case resembles a Charter application case, though 
it should technically be distinguished as a case about the scope of internal 
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procedurally inadequate way will similarly find the Charter not to 
be considered to apply.21       
 
The more interesting set of issues on Charter application to 
universities are those arising in ways that engage the distinctive 
values and character of universities, notably those such as 
universities’ limitation of expression for various reasons, with these 
situations also often implicitly interacting with at least some issues 
of academic freedom.  This paper seeks to explore these issues, to 
present a larger theoretical framework on the interaction of 
academic freedom with questions of Charter application than is 
typically contemplated, and to argue ultimately that there is room 
for Charter application to universities without any threat to their 
distinctive values and, indeed, with the possibility that Charter 
application may actually enhance the fulfillment of those values in 
contexts where universities have strayed from them.   
 
                                                 
limits on freedom of expression, with an application of the general rule 
that constitutionally protected expression does not include threats.  
Indeed, one could even read the judgment as actually presuming or even 
advocating for Charter application against university disciplinary 
proceedings aimed at student expression.  The Court states at par. 35: 
“With respect to the first issue, namely Mr. Zhang's constitutional right to 
free speech, as afforded him by s. 2(a) and (b) of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms and Part I, s. 6 of the University of Western Ontario's 
Code of Student Conduct, we have no doubt whatever about the 
correctness of the decision of the appeal committee. This court is mindful 
of the historical importance of encouraging free speech on university 
campuses, and rigorously defending the right of students to debate 
difficult and often highly unpopular issues with passion. However, free 
speech has its limits, including the making of threats and defamation of 
character. Uttering threats is proscribed by the Canadian Criminal Code. 
Defamatory libel is a serious tort. In the instant case, the panel found after 
hearing viva voce testimony from Mr. R. that he felt personally threatened 
by the Facebook posting of Mr. Zhang. In so finding, the panel was right 
to conclude that the applicant was not protected by his professed right to 
free speech.” [underlining added]. 
21.   See e.g. Maughan v. University of British Columbia, 2009 BCCA 447, leave 
to appeal to S.C.C. refused: [2009] S.C.C.A. no. 526. 
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To do so, Part II briefly reviews the rule offered on Charter 
application by Justice Deschamps in Greater Vancouver,22 the 
significance of the change reflected in it as compared to early 1990s 
jurisprudence, and how it properly leads to the Pridgen position in 
favour of universities not being “Charter-free zones”.23 The 
recognition of the expanded rule on Charter application crystallized 
effectively in Justice Deschamps’s statement is of course not novel, 
but the resulting application to the university context has been less 
discussed.  Part III categorizes several specific contexts in which the 
regulation of speech at universities has become a hotly contested 
area that has led to new advocacy for Charter application.  Part IV 
examines the main worries of universities about Charter application 
in this context, showing that the properly considered worries relate 
to certain dimensions of academic freedom, which the paper seeks 
to situate within something of a theoretical framework on academic 
freedom that partly draws upon American jurisprudence in this 
area.  Part V briefly argues that application of the Charter in the 
ways implied by Justice Deschamps’s rule as interpreted in recent 
case law does not pose a threat to values of academic freedom, 
properly understood, and may actually enhance the fulfillment of 
these values.  In doing so, Part V also identifies a variety of possible 
emerging areas of contestation in the area of universities and 
expression, trying to show in these specific contexts that Charter 
application may actually help guide universities back to a mission 
of being places of debate. 
 
II. Justice Deschamps’s Rule in Greater Vancouver 
 
The actual issue of Charter application in Greater Vancouver 
was not especially difficult on the facts of the case.24  Both transit 
authorities in the case were easily found to be controlled by 
government and thus not even to need Charter application by a 
different route. However, Deschamps J. nonetheless helpfully 
                                                 
22.  Greater Vancouver, prec., note 10. 
23.   Pridgen Trial, prec., note 12, par. 69 (“I am satisfied that the University is 
not a Charter-free zone”). 
24.   In Greater Vancouver, prec., note 10, the transit authorities that declined 
political advertising were fairly easily recognized as being government. 
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restated the legal framework within which this conclusion was now 
situated.  She explained the basic framework as follows: 
 
Thus, there are two ways to determine whether the Charter 
applies to an entity’s activities: by enquiring into the nature 
of the entity or by enquiring into the nature of its activities. 
If the entity is found to be “government”, either because of 
its very nature or because the government exercises 
substantial control over it, all its activities will be subject to 
the Charter. If an entity is not itself a government entity but 
nevertheless performs governmental activities, only those 
activities which can be said to be governmental in nature 
will be subject to the Charter.25 
 
The second branch, focused on governmental activities, is a 
branch that has grown since Eldridge.26  There, the conclusion in 
Stoffman27 that hospitals are not themselves government if they are 
not under sufficient government control was adjusted to recognize 
that certain activities of hospitals, in so far as they were delivering 
government programs and carrying out government policy 
objectives, could be governmental activities.28 Governmental 
activities need not be required in statutory form but can encompass 
a broader range of policy and program delivery.29  Where an action 
is a delivery of a government policy or program, that governmental 
activity is subject to the Charter’s application, even if other activities 
of the same entity are not—this is the rule that Deschamps J. 
crystallizes so succinctly in Greater Vancouver.30 
 
                                                 
25.   Id., par. 16. 
26.   Eldridge, prec., note 2. 
27.   Stoffman v. Vancouver General Hospital, prec., note 2. 
28.   Eldridge, prec., note 2.  But see Rasouli (Litigation Guardian of) 
v. Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre, 2011 ONSC 1500, 105 O.R. (3d) 
761, par. 84-93, affd on other grounds 2011 ONCA 482, 107 O.R. (3d) 9, 
leave to appeal granted [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 329 (trial court going through 
some reasoning suggesting Charter does not apply to doctors, albeit based 
on older case law). 
29.   Eldridge, prec., note 2, par. 44. 
30.   Greater Vancouver, prec., note 10, par. 16. 
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This rule marks a meaningful change from the set of cases 
enunciated alongside McKinney.31  To say as much should not be 
surprising in so far as Eldridge32 marked a departure from 
Stoffman33 and a subsequent recognition that hospitals are not 
“Charter-free zones”.  The same principle naturally applies against 
McKinney itself—where McKinney could have been read as 
precluding the application of the Charter to universities in general 
terms, the rule that developed in Eldridge and was given clear voice 
by Deschamps J. in Greater Vancouver says that if some activities 
of universities amount to delivery of government policies and 
programs, then those activities will be subject to the Charter.  
Universities are not “Charter-free zones”.34  Although that point was 
not widely noticed immediately after Eldridge, logical and legal 
consistency can lead to no other conclusion.   
 
This application of the Charter to specific activities of 
universities has now received recognition through to the Court of 
Appeal level in Alberta. The case of Pridgen v. University of Calgary35 
involved the university imposing disciplinary proceedings against 
two young students for posting comments on their Facebook walls 
in which they criticized a sessional lecturer as having been an 
ineffective teacher.  The students objected to the restriction of their 
expression and ultimately pursued litigation.   
 
At trial, the judge highlighted a passage in McKinney that 
could lead to a reading of it that is consistent with the later case 
                                                 
31.   McKinney v. University of Guelph, prec., note 6. 
32.   Eldridge, prec., note 2. 
33.   Stoffman v. Vancouver General Hospital, prec., note 2. 
34.    Pridgen Trial, prec., note 12, par. 69. 
35.   Id., note 12, affd Pridgen CA, prec., note 12. 
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law36 and referenced the developments in Eldridge.37  Based on an 
analogy to Eldridge, the Charter could apply: 
 
In my view, the circumstances in this case are analogous to 
those in Eldridge as the University is acting as the agent of 
the provincial government in providing accessible 
post-secondary education services to students in Alberta 
pursuant to the provisions of the PSL Act… In this context, 
I find that the University is tasked with implementing a 
specific government policy for the provision of accessible 
post-secondary education to the public in Alberta, thus 
bringing the facts of this case into line with Eldridge.38 
 
This trial decision was upheld by the Alberta Court of Appeal, 
albeit in a somewhat more confusing manner than needed to be the 
case.  The lead judgment of Paperny J.A. carries out a masterful 
overview of different categories of Charter application, each of which 
she goes on to detail, but which she could summarize as follows: 
 
A review of the authorities yields five broad categories of 
government or government activities to which the Charter 
applies. 
1.  Legislative enactments; 
2.  Government actors by nature; 
3.  Government actors by virtue of legislative 
control; 
4.  Bodies exercising statutory authority; and 
                                                 
36.   Id., note 12, par. 38, quoting McKinney, prec., note 6 at par. 42 (“There 
may be situations in respect of specific activities where it can fairly be said 
that the decision is that of the government, or that the government 
sufficiently partakes in the decision as to make it an act of government, 
but there is nothing here to indicate any participation in the decision by 
the government and, as noted, there is no statutory requirement imposing 
mandatory retirement on the universities”). 
37.  Pridgen Trial, prec., note 12, par. 42-48, culminating in par. 48 (“As the 
Supreme Court recognized in Eldridge, the Charter may apply in one of two 
ways; it may apply to a government actor or it may apply to 
non-government actors responsible for the implementation of a specific 
government policy or activity”). 
38.   Id., par. 59 and 63. 
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5.  Non-governmental bodies implementing 
government objectives.39 
   
Justice Paperny would have held the Charter to apply on the 
same basis as the trial judge had held, in the form of the university’s 
implementation of governmental policy in the area of post-
secondary education, but she suggested there was another 
alternative route to application on the facts of the case in terms of 
the statutory compulsion the university exercised against the 
students.40 
 
Justice McDonald wrote a separate concurring judgment 
based solely on administrative law grounds, preferring not to decide 
the Charter application issue.41 Justice O’Ferrall rounded things out 
with a third concurring judgment in which he held that the 
university bodies ought to have considered civil rights values like 
freedom of expression in their decision-making, although not 
necessarily because of Charter application but also because of long-
standing traditions of freedom of expression within the common 
law.42  One could almost characterize the situation as one of three 
judges with four opinions. But it nonetheless seems right to take 
the opinion of Paperny J.A. as the lead judgment, which answered 
the questions put before the Court, and which can derive further 
support from dimensions of O’Ferrall J.A.’s slightly more equivocal 
analysis.   
 
The rule developed in part in Eldridge and put powerfully by 
Deschamps J. in Greater Vancouver leads to a conclusion, as 
recognized by Paperny J.A. in the Alberta Court of Appeal in 
Pridgen, that the Charter can apply to some activities of universities, 
particularly when the activities in question are implementing 
governmental policies.  
 
                                                 
39.   Pridgen CA, prec., note 12, par. 78. 
40.   Id., par. 104-106. 
41.   Id., par. 130. 
42.   Id., par. 178. 
PDF Page: RDUS.p0152.pdf
Process Template:PDF_proofs_HI
Date: 15-10-13
Time: 08:10:52
Color: Black
Operator: ____________________________
PageMark-Color-Comp
❏ OK to proceed
❏ Make corrections and proceed
❏ Make corrections and show another proof
Signed:  ___________________  Date:  ______
Application 
(2015) 45 R.D.U.S. of the Charter  145 
 to Universities’ Limitation of Expression 
 
 
III. Contested Instances of Charter Application to 
Universities 
 
This reality that universities are not immune to the Charter 
raises, however, the question of in what activities universities are 
subject to the Charter. A full-fledged answer could well examine 
many different areas of university policy.  However, the particular 
area that has been contentious in recent case law concerns several 
spheres in which universities have acted in ways limiting 
expression. It is however possible to identify several categories 
within these expression-limiting actions, so as to consider the 
possibility that there are pertinent distinctions between some of 
them.  For the moment, for purposes of this part, it is worth simply 
categorizing applications that have already received attention in the 
limited case law to date, with Part V later turning to more 
prospective possibilities. 
 
One category has consisted of limitation of expression by 
students concerning the university itself.  The Pridgen case fits this 
category in so far as it concerned student comment on the teaching 
a university provided.43 A second category has consisted of 
limitation of expression by individuals (including non-students) on 
matters that could be under discussion within a university, 
encompassing within broad academic terms potentially all matters 
of human existence. Freedom of expression challenges have 
succeeded, for example, in some instances against universities that 
sought to preclude individuals from placing flyers on vehicles that 
presented individuals’ (controversial and quite possibly emotionally 
distressing to some readers) perspectives on issues of morality and 
public policy that might reasonably be thought to be under 
discussion within a university.44 Similarly, Charter freedom of 
                                                 
43.   Id. 
44.  See R. v. Whatcott, 2012 ABQB 231 (Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench 
holding on an appeal that Charter applied to university using trespass 
statutes to prevent Whatcott from putting flyers on cars, with judge 
elaborating several different bases for Charter application and going on to 
hold that Whatcott’s freedom of expression violated by university).  See 
also R. v. Whatcott, 2002 SKQB 399 (Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s 
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expression rights were an important dimension in a recent 
determination against the University of Calgary in constraints it had 
put on students’ political and moral expression (requiring them to 
display placards in a certain manner to limit their visibility) on a 
controversial public policy issue.45 A third category could consist of 
challenges to academic judgment on expression, with there having 
been instances where students challenged academic judgments 
that their work did not meet particular standards (of excellence or 
of success).46    
 
Already, it might be apparent that the first two categories are 
different from the third. As will be elaborated in the next Part, the 
first two relate to expression that has actually traditionally been at 
the core of what academic freedom protects, and a limitation on this 
expression purportedly based on academic freedom thus comes 
across immediately as tension-laden. The third category, however, 
consists of what is actually a challenge to the exercise of a 
dimension of academic freedom; part of academic freedom is the 
exercise of proper academic judgment on things expressed.47 The 
third category of limitation thus might be much more readily 
                                                 
Bench holding that Charter applied in context of university having adopted 
bylaws that were used to prevent Whatcott from putting flyers on cars). 
45.   See Wilson v. University of Calgary, 2014 ABQB 190 (Horner J. ultimately 
concluding, based on a mixture of reasons including the severity of threat 
to Charter expression rights in the university’s conduct, that the university 
had not provided sufficient appeal mechanisms for the students, with the 
university’s later determinations resulting from the judgment in more 
recent months ultimately finding in favour of the students).  
46.  For examples along these lines, see e.g. Alghaithy v. University of Ottawa, 
2012 ONSC 142 (concerning student attempting to challenge 
neurosurgery program deeming some of his emails unprofessional and 
thus affecting his place in the residency program); Maughan, prec., note 
21. 
47.   See Eric BARENDT, Academic Freedom and the Law: A Comparative Study, 
Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010, p. 110 (describing the English legal 
principle that “universities and other bodies such as funding councils 
enjoy unfettered discretion to make purely academic judgments”, 
something also found in German and American case law).  The same 
principle runs through case law in Canada on the role of the university 
“visitor”.  See e.g. King v. University of Saskatchewan, [1969] S.C.R. 678; 
University of Saskatchewan v. Pearlman, 2006 SKCA 105. 
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justified as against application of the Charter (even though one 
could obviously imagine instances in which it would be abused).  
 
However, there are further categories of cases that have also 
arisen that may initially seem of a significantly different category 
but are actually arguably closer to the educational context than 
may be first apparent.  These concern regulation by a university of 
dimensions of student government48 or of extracurricular activities, 
including through allocation of space for extracurricular activities.49   
Courts have rejected Charter application in some such cases, 
notably in Lobo v. Carleton University.50  The case concerned a claim 
by students to use space for their extracurricular activities that 
involved the expression of particular moral, religious, and political 
views, and the trial court held that the university decision was not 
subject to the Charter because it was not implementing any specific 
governmental program or policy,51 something the Court of Appeal 
upheld in an oral judgment of a scant few paragraphs.52 
 
One question that arises is whether the informal curriculum 
of an educational institution can be so easily distinguished from the 
formal curriculum, so as to say that student extracurricular 
activities have no place within their educational experience and 
academic activity.53  If this distinction cannot be so fiercely drawn, 
then it may be that this category is no different than others in which 
student expression of views is limited. 
                                                 
48.   For an example, see Telfer v. University of Western Ontario, 2012 ONSC 
1287 (Court not applying Charter to disciplinary proceeding arising from 
conduct in student election context, although with Court splitting on 
administrative law dimensions in the case).   
49.   See e.g. Lobo v. Carleton University, 2012 ONSC 254, affd 2012 ONCA 
498. 
50.   Id. 
51.   Id. 
52.   Lobo v. Carleton University, 2012 ONCA 498. 
53.   Drawing on other literature, Paul Clarke suggests that the informal 
curriculum—what an educational institution teaches about behaviours 
and values through aspects of the institution outside the formal 
curriculum—may be just as important to the educational experience.  See 
Paul T. CLARKE, Understanding Curricular Control: Rights Conflicts, Public 
Education, and the Charter, London, Althouse Press, 2013, p. 161. 
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IV. Academic Freedom and Charter Application 
 
Universities themselves have not been enthusiastic to see the 
Charter apply to their activities.  At one level, this reticence reflects 
a simple desire to avoid the legal complexity that may ensue, as they 
then have to distinguish between university activities to which the 
Charter does and does not apply and test their activities for Charter 
compliance, no doubt at meaningful financial cost. Any business 
owner could likely empathize with the challenges awaiting 
university administrators subjected to a new layer of legal 
complexity.  However, in many contexts, there have been holdings 
that mere administrative inconvenience is no reason to reject 
Charter claims,54 and the same principle surely applies here to 
Charter application. 
 
A separate argument raises academic freedom, whether in 
more general terms or in terms of institutional independence of 
academic institutions. Both arguments were put at the Alberta 
Court of Appeal in Pridgen.55 This argument certainly seems more 
important than the question of administrative inconvenience for 
academic institutions. If academic institutions are a sphere unto 
themselves, deserving of institutional independence and academic 
freedom, the claim that they are properly outside the scope of the 
Charter has more plausibility. 
 
Canada does not have a specific doctrine of academic 
freedom, unlike other democratic states of interest.56  In Canada, 
there are some brief references to academic freedom in McKinney, 
where LaForest J. refers to the value of academic freedom as the 
“free and fearless search for knowledge and the propagation of 
                                                 
54.   See e.g. Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 
177. 
55.   Pridgen CA, prec., note 12, par. 3. 
56.   For a comparative analysis of Germany, the United States, and the United 
Kingdom, see BARENDT, prec., note 47. 
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ideas”57 and suggests that it is “essential to our continuance as a 
lively democracy”.58  But he gives it no specific legal force.   
 
Germany, by contrast to Canada, has an actual textual 
provision in its constitution to guarantee scientific and teaching 
freedom (Wissenschaftsfreiheit and Lehrfreiheit).59 The United 
States, by contrast to Canada, has actually developed a 
constitutional academic freedom doctrine, with prominent United 
States Supreme Court statements in favor of both academic 
freedom generally60 and institutional academic freedom.61  Indeed, 
the US cases appear to enunciate a constitutional weight to 
academic freedom—as an expression of First Amendment values—
that could weigh off against other constitutional values in certain 
circumstances.62  This is a concept that Canada could reasonably 
                                                 
57.   McKinney, prec., note 6, par. 62. 
58.   Id., par. 69. 
59.   Article 5(3) of the German Basic Law states: “Art and science, research and 
teaching, shall be free.  Freedom of teaching shall not absolve from loyalty 
to the constitution.”  This is the translation in BARENDT, prec., note 47, 
p. 117. 
60.   See e.g. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 & 263 (1957) (both 
Warren CJ and Frankfurter J offering statements supportive of academic 
freedom, with Frankfurter J’s being particularly quoted elsewhere); 
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (Brennan J 
offering a robust defence of academic freedom amid case where majority 
upholds faculty members’ challenge to a New York statute requiring 
dismissal on several political grounds).  
61.   See e.g. Regents for the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 
(1978) (universities entitled to pursue diversity policies partly because of 
their institutional independence being a counterweight to constitutional 
discrimination claims); Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 
U.S. 214 (1985) (Court to respect faculty professional judgments except in 
extreme cases); Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin v. Southworth, 
529 U.S. 217 (2000) (university’s institutional independence entitling it to 
require students to pay fees to support student organizations even where 
disagreement with particular organizations, with organizational dimension 
to university’s rights); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2000) 
(O’Connor J. referring to how “universities occupy a special niche in our 
constitutional tradition”).  
62.   This effectively remains the present position on affirmative action 
implemented for purposes of diversity within the academic institution.  See 
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draw upon.  Although s. 2(b) extends freedom of expression to 
various textually determined contexts that do not specifically 
include academic freedom, academic freedom would appear to be a 
reasonable analogous extension. 
 
The implications of this extension, however, do not weigh 
easily in favor of any academic institutional immunity from Charter 
scrutiny, at least in the particular context of freedom of expression.  
The very purposes of such a freedom make freely exchanged ideas 
quite central to its fulfillment.  So, if the main contexts giving rise 
to issues, as suggested in the last Part, concern university 
limitations on expression, then there is little reason to identify 
academic freedom giving rise to a reason for constraint on Charter 
application.  In this context, Charter application actually furthers 
the values of academia. 
 
That said, some could object that the Charter was not 
necessarily designed for purposes of regulating universities and 
that application via s. 32 is thus something of a blunt instrument 
for oversight of universities and one that threatens institutional 
independence. On such an argument, academic freedom would 
then be constrained by Charter application, and there would be 
preferable means of oversight, such as the institution of the 
university “visitor”.63  And, indeed, there might well be some core 
academic activities—such as the critical assessment of ideas 
through exercise of academic judgment—that merit profound 
deference.64 There will even be needs for academic organization that 
may give rise to reason to defer to certain institutional decisions.65  
                                                 
generally Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 570 U.S. ___ (2013) (slip 
op.). 
63.   For an overview of this institution, see generally Pearlman, prec., note 47.  
See also J.L. CALDWELL, “Judicial Review of Universities—The Visitor and 
the Visited” (1982) 1 Canterbury L. Rev. 307. 
64.   Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing, prec., note 61 (Court to respect 
faculty professional judgments except in extreme cases). 
65.   Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin v. Southworth, prec., note 61 
(university’s institutional independence entitling it to require students to 
pay fees to support student organizations even where disagreement with 
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However, it is frankly not clear that there is anything in the idea of 
academic freedom that obviously, inherently calls for Charter 
immunity. Universities as Charter-free zones have shown 
themselves, as institutions, to be subject to forces that lead them 
away from their own values.  As the last Part will show, in the kinds 
of situations where Charter claims are arising, application of the 
Charter actually has the potential to preserve academic values. 
 
V. Charter Application as Furthering Academic Values 
 
Given the kind of situations in which Charter application to 
universities has been argued, there is reason to say that Charter 
application could actually further academic values. Justice Paperny 
in Pridgen engages in some analysis of the academic freedom 
arguments, and she concludes as follows:  
 
In my view, there is no legitimate conceptual conflict 
between academic freedom and freedom of expression. 
Academic freedom and the guarantee of freedom of 
expression contained in the Charter are handmaidens to 
the same goals; the meaningful exchange of ideas, the 
promotion of learning, and the pursuit of knowledge. There 
is no apparent reason why they cannot comfortably co-
exist. That said, if circumstances arise where these values 
actually collide, a section 1 analysis would be required to 
properly balance them. That circumstance does not arise in 
this case.66 
   
Two key points are present in this passage.  First, there is no 
conflict between academic freedom and freedom of expression.  
Second, there is a way to take into account the considerations of 
academic freedom elsewhere in the Charter analysis rather than as 
giving rise to an argument against Charter application. Quite 
simply, the availability of a limitations analysis means that there 
always remains a mechanism by which academic freedom 
considerations can be part of the analysis.  Where universities limit 
                                                 
particular organizations, with organizational dimension to university’s 
rights). 
66.   Pridgen CA, prec., note 12, par. 117. 
PDF Page: RDUS.p0159.pdf
Process Template:PDF_proofs_HI
Date: 15-10-13
Time: 08:10:52
Color: Black
Operator: ____________________________
PageMark-Color-Comp
❏ OK to proceed
❏ Make corrections and proceed
❏ Make corrections and show another proof
Signed:  ___________________  Date:  ______
Application 
152 of the Charter  (2015) 45 R.D.U.S. 
 to Universities’ Limitation of Expression 
 
 
Charter rights, they may have a justification for doing so in 
considerations of academic freedom, but they should need to prove 
this justification rather than simply to wave around generalized 
academic freedom considerations before claiming Charter 
immunity. 
 
Within a short article focused specifically on identifying the 
application of the Charter to university freedom of expression 
issues, it would of course be out of place to attempt a complete 
typology of possible freedom of expression issues that may arise on 
campus. Such a typology would relate more to a substantive Charter 
analysis of campus expression.  However, it is nonetheless worth 
identifying the sorts of issues that Charter application in this 
context may open to constitutional scrutiny, so as to reinforce the 
point that Charter application actually has prospects of furthering 
academic freedom.   
 
University campuses have actually become places where 
freedom of expression comes under many different sorts of threats, 
a phenomenon not unique to Canada. Indeed, the United States has 
seen some of the issues much more exposed and scrutinized.67 
However, many of the sorts of restraints on expression on university 
campuses have overlapped those in Canada. As catalogued by those 
examining restraints on campus expression, they have included 
such matters as: constraints on student groups expressing views 
on controversial issues; viewpoint constraints, such as in the 
cancellation of speakers promulgating views on controversial 
issues; campus speech codes of various sorts that often have 
chilling effects beyond those intended; and removals of individuals 
from academic posts based on expression of particular viewpoints.68  
                                                 
67.   See e.g. Donald Alexander DOWNS, Restoring Free Speech and Liberty on 
Campus, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
68.   See id.  For further cataloguing of issues, particularly helpful are the 
ongoing reports in the United States by the Foundation for Individual 
Rights in Education (FIRE) and in Canada by the Justice Centre for 
Constitutional Freedoms (JCCF), with its annual Campus Freedom Index. 
Such matters as the removal of individuals from academic posts is not a 
mere bogeyman of the imagination, as seen with the widespread public 
attention to the termination from both an administrative position and his 
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Another category, of course, whose status as “on-campus” or “off-
campus” is sometimes part of the issue at stake pertains to 
university disciplining of students for cyberspeech that may or may 
not have any physical link to campus, with such discipline arising 
overwhelmingly from negative comments about school officials.69  
Notably, many of these constraints on expression actually limit or 
chill academic speech or speech on the sort of policy issues in which 
one would hope students and faculty would engage. 
 
To the extent they are focused on facilitating matters like 
equal participation in the educational environment, some of these 
restraints on expression will of course gain greater sympathy within 
the Canadian context, where less absolutist versions of freedom of 
expression prevail than in the United States.  Thus, whereas the 
regulation by universities of actual expressions of hatred in the 
United States needs to focus on forms of expression actually 
promoting intimidation,70 there will be more possible arguments to 
raise within a Canadian proportionality analysis for rights 
limitation.  With that reality, there is very little prospect that Charter 
                                                 
tenure (later reversed) by the University of Saskatchewan of Robert 
Buckingham in mid-2014 or the less widespread public attention to the 
University of Calgary’s attempts to present Tom Flanagan as having been 
moved into retirement in 2013 after a controversial video of public 
statements during a presentation.  The latter is detailed in Tom FLANAGAN, 
Persona Non Grata, Toronto, McLelland & Stewart, 2014.  On campus 
speech codes, there is an extensive American case law on their often 
overbroad construction – see e.g. DeJohn v. Temple University, 537 F.3d 
301 (3d Cir. 2008) – and growing scholarship on their chilling effects – see 
e.g. Azhar MAJEED, “Defying the Constitution: The Rise, Persistence, and 
Prevalence of Campus Speech Codes”, (2009) 7 Georgetown J. L. & Public 
Pol’y 481; and Steven R. GLASER, “Sticks and Stones May Break My Bones 
But Words Can Never Hurt Me: Regulating Speech on University 
Campuses”, (1992) 76 Marquette L. Rev. 265 (the latter showing instances 
of campus speech codes that chilled discussion of cases in a law school 
environment). 
69.   For a discussion in the American context of the extensive case law on the 
issue, see Emily GOLD WALDRAM, “Badmouthing Authority: Hostile Speech 
About School Officials and the Limits of School Restrictions”, (2011) 19 
Wm. & Mary Bill of Rights J. 591.  
70.   For discussion, see Alexander TSESIS, “Burning Crosses on Campus: 
University Hate Speech Codes”, (2010) 43 Connecticut L. Rev. 617. 
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application in respect of campus freedom of expression issues will 
harm universities’ pursuit of their mission.   
 
Indeed, on the contrary, Charter freedom of expression 
arguments on campus are likely to further universities’ academic 
mission.  The types of expression at issue bear centrally on the 
academic mission of universities.  Thus, the American Association 
of University Professors has issued a strong statement in defence of 
free speech on campuses, putting the point baldly: “On a campus 
that is free and open, no idea can be banned or forbidden. No 
viewpoint or message may be deemed so hateful or disturbing that 
it may not be expressed”.71  Or, in a Canadian context, as stated by 
Jeffrey J., 
 
[The university mission] is consistent with a University 
campus that is censorship-free not Charter-free. This is 
consistent with divergent viewpoints on campus being 
encouraged, not curtailed by wielding the powers of the 
state merely to save an attendee from having to contend 
with, or even just encounter, an alternate perspective. Does 
anyone actually expect to attend a university campus and 
encounter only the ideas they already embrace? Are only 
select viewpoints now permissible on our university 
campuses? John Stuart Mill in his essay “On Liberty” 
opined that “he who knows only his own side of the case, 
knows little of that”.72 
 
Returning to the application issue, the rule offered by 
Deschamps J. in Greater Vancouver,73 which focuses on activities 
furthering governmental programs or policies, is fully coherent with 
applying the Charter to university educational and academic 
activities within the formal and informal curricula. This 
consequence might not have been contemplated by the Court at the 
time, but it is a valuable result. In the context of contemporary 
universities often restricting expression (or failing to protect 
                                                 
71.   Council of the American Association of University Professors, “On Freedom 
of Expression and Campus Speech Codes”, (November 1994). 
72.   R. v. Whatcott, 2012 ABQB 231, par. 33. 
73.   Greater Vancouver, prec., note 10. 
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expression), the Charter may actually be a means of saving them 
and their own values from themselves. 
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